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Abstract
When verifiable performance measures are imperfect, organizations often resort to sub-
jective performance pay. This may give supervisors the power to direct employees towards
tasks that mainly benefit the supervisor rather than the organization. We cast a principal-
supervisor-agent model in a multitask setting, where the supervisor has an intrinsic prefer-
ence towards specific tasks. We show that subjective performance pay based on evaluation
by a biased supervisor has the same distorting effect on the agent’s effort allocation as in-
centive pay based on an incongruent performance measure. If the principal can combine
incongruent performance measures with biased supervision, the distortion in the agent’s
efforts is mitigated, but cannot always be eliminated. We apply our results to the choice
between specialist and generalist middle managers, where a trade-off between expertise and
bias may arise.
JEL codes: J24, M12, M52.
Keywords: subjective performance evaluation, middle managers, incentives, multitask-
ing.
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1 Introduction
In many organizations, middle managers’ assessment of employees’ performance is an
important determinant of bonus pay and career prospects.1 If verifiable performance
measures are imperfect, subjective performance evaluation may provide a more accurate
assessment of employees’ performance, thereby providing better incentives for employees
to perform well. On the other hand, by its very nature, subjective performance evalua-
tion can be manipulated, weakening the link between actual and reported performance.
Furthermore, managers’ role in determining employees’ bonus pay and promotion op-
portunities gives them (more) power over their subordinates. Earlier work has shown
that subjective performance pay based on middle managers’ evaluations can be prone
to favoritism (Prendergast and Topel 1996, Bol 2011, Dur and Tichem 2015), collusion
(Tirole 1986, Thiele 2013), extortion (Laffont 1990, Vafa¨ı 2002, 2010), and a lack of
incentives or ability to monitor on the side of the manager (Gibbs et al. 2004, Bol 2011,
Kamphorst and Swank 2012).
In this paper, we show that a supervisor can use the discretion inherent in subjective
performance evaluation to pull agents towards tasks that benefit the supervisor more
than the organization. We develop a principal-supervisor-agent model, where the agent
exerts effort on multiple tasks. Efforts are not observable to the principal. The supervisor
observes the agent’s efforts with a probability that is increasing in the supervisor’s ability.
The supervisor provides a report on the agent’s efforts to the principal, which can be
used in determining the agent’s (incentive) pay. Crucially, we assume that the supervisor
has an intrinsic preference for particular tasks exerted by the agent. This makes that she
overemphasizes these tasks when providing directions to the agent. Anticipating that
not living up to the supervisor’s expectations results in a bad evaluation, the agent works
1For instance, Eccles and Crane (1988), Gibbs (1995), and Bol (2011) document the use of subjective
performance evaluation in (financial) service firms, Breuer et al. (2013) in a large call-center, Gibbs et
al. (2004) in car-dealerships, Woods (2012) in an internal audit firm, and Medoff and Abraham (1980)
in manufacturing firms.
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towards the supervisor’s goals. When the supervisor’s preferences are not aligned with
the principal’s goals, this hurts the principal. As a consequence, akin to the standard
multitasking model (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991, Baker 1992, 2002), the principal
optimally sets weaker subjective performance pay when the supervisor’s preferences are
less aligned, as well as when the supervisor has lower ability.2
This changes when the principal has access to an imperfect but verifiable performance
measure. This measure can be ineffective, implying that it does not always provide a
signal of performance, as well as incongruent. To structure ideas, consider one salesman
of a local store owned by an electronics retail chain. The store’s manager is an active
member of the local community, so that she cares a lot about her store’s reputation for
providing good service. The salesman contributes to long-run store performance through
sales effort and service effort. The latter does not contribute directly to short-run sales,
but increases the reputation of the local store, which has long-run benefits to the retail
chain. The store manager typically observes efforts, but the chain’s headquarters only
observes sales. If headquarters uses the salesman’s sales figures to provide incentive pay,
he will focus his efforts disproportionately on sales at the expense of service, leading to
a sub-optimal outcome. Alternatively, headquarters could relate the salesman’s pay to
his performance evaluation as provided by the store manager. However, in evaluating
performance, the store manager will put too much emphasis on service provision, thereby
inducing the salesman to exert suboptimally low sales effort (from the perspective of
headquarters). Combining verifiable sales figures with subjective performance evaluation
in the salesman’s bonus plan may bring several advantages. First, headquarters can use
sales targets, which constrains the store manager in emphasizing service at the expense
of sales. Second, the inclusion of subjective performance evaluation allows the store
manager to pull the salesman away from the disproportionate focus on sales induced
2Supervisors can also use their power to affect (the behaviour of) employees in ways that are not
directly linked to employees’ tasks at work, e.g. by engaging in bullying, extortion, (sexual) harassment,
etc. Our interest lies with supervisors’ incentives to provide misaligned directions regarding employees’
efforts at work.
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by the verifiable sales measure. Third, the sales figures may give the store manager
additional information on the salesman’s efforts, which allows for better monitoring.3
We show that combining verifiable performance measurement and subjective perfor-
mance evaluation mitigates the distortion that arises when using either type of perfor-
mance measurement exclusively. This echoes findings in the multitasking literature on
combining multiple incongruent performance measures (Feltham and Xie 1994, Datar et
al. 2001, Budde 2007). This literature has shown that full congruence can be achieved
if the number of verifiable measures meets or exceeds the number of tasks (although full
congruence is not optimal if the measures differ in noisiness and agents are risk-averse).
Even when all measures are biased towards the same task, congruence is possible by plac-
ing a negative weight on the most biased measure. In contrast, we show that this does
not hold when some measures are subjectively determined, because placing a negative
weight on the subjective evaluation is ineffective. The supervisor uses any discretionary
power to put more emphasis on the tasks she considers undervalued in the objective per-
formance measures. If a good evaluation has a positive (negative) effect on the agent’s
compensation, the supervisor threatens to provide a bad (good) evaluation unless the
agent follows her directions. Hence, congruence is not feasible when the supervisor is
even more biased than the verifiable performance measure.
The principal prefers the verifiable performance measure and the supervisor to have
opposite biases compared to his relative valuation of tasks. We show that this allows the
principal to implement non-distorted efforts, unless either the performance measure or
the supervisor is relatively ineffective. If the probability that the performance measure
provides a signal of the agent’s efforts is too low, the supervisor ignores the performance
target and induces her most preferred effort allocation. If the supervisor’s ability is too
low, the agent ignores her instructions and meets the performance target at lowest effort
cost by working purely towards measured performance. In both situations, the principal
3For an example of an incentive plan that combines verifiable performance measures and subjective
performance evaluation in a retail setting, see Bouwens and Kroos (2011).
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optimally adjusts the performance target to allow for some bias in implemented efforts
and reduces the strength of the agent’s incentive pay.
The key novelty of our model is that the supervisor has intrinsic preferences over
her subordinates’ tasks, which may differ from the principal’s relative valuation of these
tasks. Such preferences could be driven by private benefits, by career concerns, or by
professional norms. For instance, the supervisor may overemphasize providing inputs
into her own work, thereby reducing her own workload. In a multi-unit organization,
the supervisor could overemphasize tasks that benefit the supervisor’s unit at the ex-
pense of activities that benefit other units. Alternatively, the supervisor may intrin-
sically consider particular tasks more important. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) suggest
that internalization of norms is an important element of professional training (of e.g.
physicians, scientists, and teachers). Professional norms may guide what is considered
to be worthy of doing, and supervisors may impose these norms on their subordinates.
Relatedly, Prendergast (2007) considers bureaucrats who care more or less for clients’
well-being than the principal, possibly leading to over- or underprovision of services to
clients.4
In our setup, a biased supervisor uses her discretionary power to direct employees
towards activities that benefit her. Middle managers questioned by Guth and MacMillan
(1986) stated that they sometimes make decisions that are not aligned with corporate
strategy and goals, in order to protect their self-interest. Burgelman (1994) describes
events at Intel in the 1980s, where middle managers made decisions on the allocation
of R&D and manufacturing capacity that went against corporate strategy, eventually
forcing senior management to change strategy.5 Our analysis shows that misaligned
4The supervisor’s bias in preferences over tasks differs from interpersonal preferences towards em-
ployees, such as altruism, spite or favouritism, as studied by e.g. Prendergast and Topel (1996), Giebe
and Gu¨rtler (2012), and Dur and Tichem (2015). These papers show that interpersonal preferences mute
the incentive effect of subjective performance pay by weakening the link between agent’s effort and pay.
5Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) provide a rationale for giving middle managers some discretion to
go against corporate strategy. They argue that combining a visionary CEO, who champions some units
or product lines over others, with more neutral middle management provides strong incentives to come
up with investment projects for employees in the favoured units, while if they nonetheless fail to find
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middle management may, but need not be detrimental for firm performance, depending
on the available verifiable performance measures.
Most earlier work on combining subjective and objective performance measures con-
siders subjective evaluation by the principal (Baker et al. 1994, Schmidt and Schnitzer
1995, Pearce and Stacchetti 1998, Budde 2007). Following Bull (1987), the emphasis
lies on self-enforcing relational contracts, where the size of the subjectively determined
bonus is restricted by the principal’s incentive to give low evaluations despite good per-
formance in order to save on bonus payments.6 Thiele (2013) shows that in this setting
delegation of subjective performance evaluation to a supervisor also entails low-powered
incentives, in order to prevent collusion. Following Tirole (1986), collusion is also the
main issue studied in static three-tier hierarchy models; for overviews see Laffont and
Rochet (1997) and Mookherjee (2013). In this paper, we assume away the problem of
collusion in our static model by assuming that side-contracts are not enforceable. In-
stead, we focus on the effects of supervisor bias on the interaction between subjective
and objective performance evaluation.
Most related to our work are Laffont (1990) and Vafa¨ı (2002, 2010), who study abuse
of authority by the supervisor. In a setting with two agents and hard information on
total output, Laffont (1990) shows that a supervisor can extort favors or side-payments
from her subordinates by threatening to manipulate individual performance information.
In response, the principal optimally reduces the weight on individual performance as
reported by the supervisor in the agent’s incentive pay, relative to the weight on total
output. In Vafa¨ı (2002, 2010), the supervisor may receive hard information about the
agent’s performance and can decide to conceal this information from the principal. Vafa¨ı
(2002) shows that the supervisor can collude with the agent when performance is bad,
and can demand a bribe from the agent when performance is good. Preventing this
suitable projects, middle managers can allocate funds towards projects in other units.
6Suvorov and Van de Ven (2009) and Zabojnik (2014) show that the incentive to underreport is
considerably smaller when the principal uses performance evaluation not only to promote effort, but also
to provide the agent with information about his ability.
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abuse of authority requires that the agent’s pay is not higher after a report showing
good performance compared to a report without performance information. This also
prevents collusion, but leaves a rent to the agent. Vafa¨ı (2010) extends the analysis to
side-payments from the principal to the supervisor. In our setting, abuse of authority
arises from the supervisor’s soft information on agent’s efforts and materializes in a
distorted effort allocation. We analyze how the principal can use (imperfect) verifiable
performance measures to constrain the supervisor’s abuse of authority.7
We use our results to contribute to the debate on the relative merit of specialists
and generalists in managerial positions. In the typical trade-off, specialists have higher
ability on a particular task, but generalists have broader skills. Garicano (2000) argues
that more able agents should be assigned to higher positions in the hierarchy in a one-
dimensional task model, so that lower-level generalists can screen for tasks that can only
be properly conducted by specialists. In contrast, Ferreira and Sah (2012) consider com-
munication between layers and argue that generalists should be higher in the hierarchy
to facilitate information transmission between lower-level units consisting of (different)
specialists. Prasad (2009) argues that in a setting where tasks are complements, gen-
eralists are more likely to work on multiple tasks than specialists. He finds supporting
evidence among non-academic researchers with doctoral degrees in the US, for whom
the probability of getting management tasks is decreasing in past research success.
We argue that while specialists may have better monitoring ability, they are also more
likely to have biased preferences (for instance arising from professional norms).8 We show
that in the absence of verifiable performance measures, this gives a trade-off between the
strength of subjective performance incentives and the distortion induced in the agent’s
efforts. Hence, a generalist manager is preferred when a specialist’s objectives are too
7In a setting where supervisors can conceal hard information, Kofman and Lawarree (1996) show that
assigning a second supervisor makes it possible to prevent collusion.
8This corresponds to Li (2013), who studies the decisions by reviewers of grant proposals at the US
National Institute of Health, and finds that reviewers are both biased towards projects in their own area
as well as better able to infer the quality of proposals in their own area.
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misaligned with the principal’s, while a specialist is preferred when the generalist is too
ineffective at supervision. The availability of a verifiable performance measure decreases
both the cost of supervisor bias and the benefit of better monitoring. We find that the
first effect typically outweighs the second effect, so that better verifiable performance
measures increase the relative attractiveness of specialist supervisors.
The paper is organized as follows. The setup of the model is given in Section 2,
after which we analyze benchmark cases in Section 3 and the full model in Section 4.
We apply the results to the choice between specialists and generalists for managerial
positions in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a principal-supervisor-agent model in which all players are risk neutral. The
principal (P) employs one agent (A) and one supervisor (S). The outside option utility
of both the agent and the supervisor is zero, and they are both protected by limited
liability such that wA ≥ 0 and wS ≥ 0, where wA (wS) is the total wage payment to the
agent (supervisor).
The agent works on two tasks i ∈ {1, 2}. The principal values the two tasks equally,
and his utility is given by
UP = e1 + e2 − wA − wS (1)
where ei is the agent’s effort in task i. The agent’s utility is given by:
UA = wA − 1
2
(e1)
2 − 1
2
(e2)
2 (2)
The principal cannot observe the agent’s efforts. However, there is a verifiable but
imperfect performance measure of the agent’s efforts. The measure is imperfect in two
ways. First, the performance measure is biased towards one of the tasks. If the measure
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provides a signal, the level of measured performance m is given by
m (e1, e2) = ϕe1 + (1− ϕ) e2 (3)
with ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, if ϕ 6= 12 , the relative importance of the two tasks in determining
measured performance differs from the relative valuation of the tasks by the principal.
Second, it is ex ante uncertain whether the performance measure will provide a signal
about the agent’s performance. The probability that this happens equals q, reflecting
the reliability of the performance measure. Less-than-perfect reliability may stem from
information system failures and other unforeseen events that invalidate measured per-
formance. We denote the realization of the performance measure when it provides no
signal by m = ∅. The principal can use this verifiable performance measure to provide
the agent with performance-related pay, as will be discussed below.
The only role of the supervisor is to monitor the agent. Crucially, we assume that
the supervisor cares about the tasks performed by the agent, possibly attaching differ-
ent (relative) weights to the tasks as compared to the principal. As discussed in the
Introduction, these preferences may stem from career concerns, professional norms, or
intrinsic care for the tasks’ output.9 The supervisor’s utility is given by:
US = wS + ηe1 + (1− η) e2 (4)
where η ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the supervisor has biased preferences relative to the principal’s
valuation of tasks whenever η 6= 12 .10 Our assumption of limited liability (wS ≥ 0)
implies that the principal cannot acquire the rents from intrinsic utility obtained by the
9Schnedler (2008) studies the effects of differences in the marginal cost of effort for the agent, in a
multitask setting with a risk-averse agent, a noisy verifiable performance measure, and no subjective
performance evaluation. He shows that the performance measure is optimally biased towards the least-
costly task. In our setting, allowing for intrinsic preferences over tasks on the side of the agent (leading
to differences in the net marginal cost of effort) does not affect the results qualitatively.
10In our analysis, only the relative weights of the supervisor’s preferences over tasks matters, not the
absolute level. Hence, we could multiply the last two terms of (4) with the same parameter without
affecting results.
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supervisor. We make this assumption to ensure that the optimal contract as designed by
the principal is aimed at optimizing the agent’s incentives, rather than at increasing the
supervisor’s intrinsic utility. Note that the supervisor does not incur monitoring cost.
The supervisor observes the agent’s actual effort choice with probability p, reflecting
the supervisor’s effectiveness in monitoring the agent. Whether the supervisor actually
observes the agent’s efforts is independent of whether the verifiable measure provides a
signal. The supervisor’s information is soft and cannot be made verifiable, but she can
make a verifiable report r regarding her assessment of the agent’s performance. It follows
that the supervisor’s report is cheap talk: she can provide any report independent of
the agent’s actual efforts.11 When making her report, the supervisor has access to the
signal provided by the verifiable performance measure.12 The supervisor’s report can
provide a basis for (subjective) performance pay, as the principal can make the agent’s
pay dependent on the report r.
The discussion above implies that the agent’s wage can depend on both measured
performance m and the supervisor’s report r. For expositional reasons we explicitly dis-
tinguish between purely objective performance pay b(m) and subjective performance pay
c(m, r), such that the agent’s wage equals wA(m, r) = b(m)+c(m, r).
13 The supervisor’s
wage can also be made dependent on both m and r. However, incentive pay based on the
verifiable measure m would imply that the supervisor’s relative preferences over tasks
would be drawn closer to the relative weights on tasks in m. We argue in Section 4 that
this is typically not in the principal’s interest. Furthermore, incentive pay based on r
would render the subjective performance evaluation useless, as discussed below. Hence,
11This differs from Tirole (1986) and Vafa¨ı (2010), where the supervisor reports either the true (out-
come of the agent’s) efforts or reports that she received no information.
12Supervisors typically have access to the verifiable performance information when evaluating employ-
ees. For instance, Bol (2011) shows that the form supervisors had to fill out contained both verifiable
and subjective items, where the items based on verifiable measures came with strict guidelines on how
to translate performance into rating.
13On top of this, the principal may offer fixed wage a to the agent, so that wA = a+ b(m) + c(m, r).
However, our assumption of limited liability (wA ≥ 0) makes that the principal always sets a = 0. It
also implies that the agent’s participation constraint is always fulfilled.
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the principal offers a fixed wage wS = 0, which is accepted by the supervisor.
Provided that the agent’s wage depends on the supervisor’s evaluation, the supervisor
can make demands to the agent. We assume that side-contracts are too costly to enforce
(both between the supervisor and the agent as well as between the supervisor and the
principal).14 Instead, the supervisor and the agent engage in an implicit agreement.
Given that the supervisor’s evaluation is cheap talk, her demands have most influence
when she promises to provide evaluations such that her report has a maximal effect on
the agent’s wage. Without loss of generality, we assume that the supervisor demands
effort levels e1 and e2, and promises to provide in return the report that yields the
highest wage (given measured performance m). If the supervisor learns that the agent
did not adhere to the demand, she provides the report that yields the lowest possible
wage. Effectively, this implies that the supervisor will provide one of two reports. Hence,
we can reduce the set of possible reports to two, r ∈ {rG, rB}. Note that the difference
in bonus pay following a good subjective evaluation rG and a bad subjective evaluation
rB may depend on measured performance m.
Given that the supervisor is not residual claimant and, hence, does not bear the cost
of the agent’s bonus pay, she is ex post indifferent between providing a good evaluation
and bad evaluation. We assume that after observing the agent’s effort and measured
performance m, the supervisor adheres to the implicit agreement. In a repeated game,
adhering to the implicit agreement would be strictly preferred by the supervisor, to
maintain credibility.
Lastly, we make the assumption that if the verifiable performance measure provides
no signal (m = ∅, which happens with probability 1− q), the agent receives the highest
14This makes collusion non-sustainable. The bonus is paid to the agent after the supervisor has
reported to the principal, implying that the agent has no incentive to transfer part of the bonus to the
supervisor. Collusion is studied by e.g. Tirole (1986) and Thiele (2013). Allowing for side-contracts in
our model renders subjective performance evaluation useless, as we discuss in Section 3.3.
10
possible wage, possibly conditional on the supervisor’s report:
wA(∅, r) = max
m
wA(m, r) (5)
In other words, the agent receives the maximal bonus given the supervisor’s report, un-
less the principal can prove that the agent is not entitled to this bonus. This assumption
makes that an unreliable performance measure is actually costly to the principal, as
providing incentives yields a rent to the agent (given the agent’s limited liability). In a
similar vein, we assume that if the supervisor learns nothing about the agent’s efforts,
she provides the report that yields the highest subjectively determined bonus (given
measured performance m), again implying that ineffective supervision yields rents to
the agent.15 These assumptions allow us to study the trade-off between supervisor effec-
tiveness and bias as well as the interaction between imperfect objective and subjective
performance measurement and incentive provision in a tractable way.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal offers the agent a contract, determining wA(m, r).
2. The agent accepts or rejects the contract. If the agent rejects, all players receive
their outside option payoff.
3. The supervisor demands effort levels
{
e1, e2
}
from the agent.
4. The agent chooses effort, which is observed by the supervisor with probability p.
Measured performance m is generated with probability q.
5. The supervisor sends her report r ∈ {rG, rB}.
6. Payoffs are realized.
15Alternatively, the agent could receive a bonus only when performance is both objectively measured
and observed by the supervisor. The agent would be compensated for the low probability of receiving
a bonus by high bonus levels. In our setup (in particular given our assumptions of risk-neutrality and
limited liability), this would bring higher payoffs to the principal, as an unreliable performance measure
and ineffective supervision would not lead to rents for the agent.
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We use backward induction to solve for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Benchmarks
3.1 Complete information
Suppose the principal can contract on effort directly. Neither the supervisor nor the
performance measure have any use in this case. The principal demands the effort levels
that maximize his utility (1) subject to the agent’s participation constraint UA ≥ 0,
where UA is given by (2). Ignoring the supervisor’s intrinsic utility, this gives first-best
levels of effort e1 = e2 = 1. The participation constraint of the agent is satisfied by
setting wA = 1 if and only if e1 = e2 = 1 and wA = 0 otherwise. This results in UP = 1
and UA = 0. Hence, in the absence of moral hazard problems, the principal optimally
induces the agent to balance effort levels across tasks.
3.2 Pure objective performance pay
In the absence of subjective performance evaluation, the model is a standard multitasking
model. Without loss of generality, we assume that the principal offers the agent a
fixed bonus b if measured performance (3) is above a specified target, m ≥ m, and
no bonus if m < m. The agent derives no benefits from outperforming the principal’s
target m. Hence, in meeting the principal’s target, the agent maximizes (2) subject to
m (e1, e2) = m. This gives
e1 =
ϕ
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m (6)
e2 =
1− ϕ
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m (7)
It follows that e1 = e2 only when ϕ =
1
2 . If ϕ 6= 12 , the agent provides more effort on the
task that impacts measured performance m most. Given that the agent satisfies m = m,
12
he optimally chooses an effort combination such that
e2
e1
=
1− ϕ
ϕ
(PMR)
which we refer to as the Performance Measure’s Ratio (PMR).
If the agent decides not to meet the performance target m, he only receives bonus b
if the performance measure provides no signal, which happens with probability 1−q. As
this probability is independent of effort, optimal effort is zero. Hence, the agent chooses
to meet the performance target if
b− 1
2
1
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m
2 ≥ (1− q)b (8)
which shows that the agent’s rents (1 − q)b are decreasing in the effectiveness of the
performance measure q.
The principal chooses b and m to maximize his utility (1) subject to the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint (8), which yields the following solution:
b =
1
2
q
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 (9)
m = q (10)
Regardless of the bias of the performance measure the principal demands m = q. The
principal demands lower total effort when the performance measure is more biased.16
This is reflected in the bonus paid to the agent, which is higher when the performance
measure is more aligned with the principal’s objective. Equilibrium payoffs are given by
UA =
1
2
q (1− q)
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 (11)
UP =
1
2
q
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 (12)
16Using (6) and (7), it is easily seen that the sum of efforts e1 + e2 is decreasing in | 12 − ϕ|.
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The principal benefits from having a more effective and better aligned performance
measure, as UP increases in q and decreases in |12 − ϕ|. Note that the agent’s rent
increases as the alignment of the measure and the principal’s valuation of tasks improves.
It is optimal for the principal to induce more effort the more aligned the measure, despite
the higher rents to the agent. For a given ϕ, the sum of UA and UP is maximal when
q = 1, reflecting that the principal sacrifices surplus to reduce the agent’s rent when
q < 1.
3.3 Pure subjective performance pay
Without objective performance measures, incentive pay is solely based on the super-
visor’s subjective report r. In the implicit agreement between the supervisor and the
agent, the supervisor promises to provide a positive report to the principal if the agent
performs at least effort levels e1 and e2. The agent follows the supervisor’s demands
when a good report yields a sufficiently higher bonus than a bad report. Given lim-
ited liability, the optimal incentive scheme has wage zero after a bad report, c(rB) = 0.
Below, we denote c(rG) = c.
The least costly way for the agent to satisfy the supervisor’s demands is to provide
exactly the demanded effort levels. If the agent decides to exert lower effort levels, he
only receives the bonus when the supervisor does not observe the agent’s efforts, which
happens with probability 1− p. In this case, the best alternative is to provide no effort
at all. Hence, the supervisor sets e1 and e2 to maximize her utility (4), subject to the
agent’s incentive compatibility constraint:
c− 1
2
e1
2 − 1
2
e2
2 ≥ (1− p) c (13)
In order to induce the agent to exert effort, the agent must be given a rent equal to
(1− p) c. This follows from the fact that the supervisor does not always observe whether
the agent performs as desired, so that shirking by the agent could pass undetected. The
14
incentive compatibility constraint binds as the supervisor values additional effort. The
supervisor’s optimal effort demands are given by:
e1 = η
√
2pc
η2 + (1− η)2 (14)
e2 = (1− η)
√
2pc
η2 + (1− η)2 (15)
It follows that e1 and e2 are increasing in bonus c and in the supervisor’s effectiveness
p. Both allow the supervisor to make stronger demands. Furthermore, the supervisor
induces the agent to focus disproportionately on her preferred task, demanding effort
levels such that:
e2
e1
=
1− η
η
(SR)
which we will refer to as the Supervisor’s (preferred effort) Ratio (SR).
It follows from (14) and (15) that for given c and p, the principal’s valuation of
implemented efforts, e1+e2, is higher when the supervisor’s preferences are more aligned
with the principal, i.e. when η is closer to 12 . Hence, a more aligned supervisor induces
higher total effort for a given bonus, which benefits the principal.
The principal chooses c to maximize utility (1), taking into account the supervisor’s
effort demands (14) and (15). The optimal subjective bonus is given by:
c =
1
2
p
η2 + (1− η)2 (16)
The bonus is increasing in p, as more effective supervisors leave less rents to the agent.
The bonus also increases in the alignment between the supervisor and the principal, as
more aligned supervisors use their discretionary power to demand higher total effort.
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Equilibrium effort levels are given by:
e1 =
ηp
η2 + (1− η)2 (17)
e2 =
(1− η) p
η2 + (1− η)2 (18)
Hence, if p 6= 1 and/or η 6= 12 , effort provision under subjective pay for performance is
below first-best levels.
The agent’s and principal’s equilibrium payoffs are given by:17
UA =
1
2
p (1− p)
η2 + (1− η)2 (19)
UP =
1
2
p
η2 + (1− η)2 (20)
Note that the payoffs of the agent and the principal are identical to their payoffs when
using pure objective pay for performance (see (11) and (12)), with p = q and η = ϕ (or
η = 1− ϕ). The principal responds to biased supervision by reducing subjective perfor-
mance pay, as in case of incentive pay based on the incongruent verifiable performance
measure. Hence, biased supervision is as harmful for the principal (and the agent) as
incongruent performance measures.18
It is now easily explained why we (must) abstract from side-contracting between
the supervisor on the one hand and the principal or the agent on the other hand. As
subjective performance evaluation is cheap talk and the supervisor is ex post indifferent
17The supervisor’s utility equals US = p and, hence, is independent of her preferences over tasks. The
higher utility attained by a more biased supervisor for a given bonus c is exactly offset by the reduction
in the bonus by the principal. The supervisor’s limited liability constraint makes that her utility is
irrelevant to the principal. Without limited liability, the principal would distort the bonus in order to
increase the supervisor’s intrinsic utility, which he would capture through a negative base wage.
18If the supervisor’s bias is private information, such that the principal only knows the distribution
of η but not the current supervisor’s bias, a similar result obtains. From effort levels (17) and (18), it
follows that given bonus c, the principal’s payoff is decreasing and convex in supervisor bias | 1
2
− η|.
Hence, for any distribution of bias | 1
2
− η|, the principal optimally sets a bonus below the optimal bonus
in case of a supervisor with average bias. Hence, uncertainty about supervisor bias leads to (even) weaker
subjective performance pay.
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between reports rG and rB, a contractual agreement between the supervisor and the
agent (principal) to provide a positive (negative) report in return for payment would
make the performance evaluation independent of the agent’s effort. Hence, (anticipation
of) such contracts would eliminate any benefits of subjective performance pay. In prac-
tice, subjective performance pay may lead to collusive behaviour in some organizations.
However, the pervasive use of subjective performance evaluation suggests that in many
organizations the possibility of collusion does not outweigh the (perceived) benefits of
subjective performance evaluation.
3.4 Pure subjective versus pure objective pay for performance
Comparing equilibrium effort levels under pure objective performance pay, as given by
(6) and (7) with m = q, and subjective pay for performance, as given by (17) and (18),
shows that objective performance pay yields the same outcome as subjective performance
pay if p = q and η = ϕ or η = 1− ϕ. Then, both means of incentivizing the agent yield
the same distortion in efforts and have the same quality of monitoring.
0
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1
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ϕ
η
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Subjective
Objective Objective
Figure 1: Preferred pure incentive mechanism if p = q (solid) and p = 4
5
q (dashed).
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More generally, suppose that the principal must choose between implementing either
objective or subjective performance pay. Comparing the principal’s payoffs (12) and
(20) shows that the principal is better off using discretionary performance pay when:
p
q
>
η2 + (1− η)2
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 (21)
Even if the supervisor is more biased than the performance measure (e.g. when 12 <
ϕ < η), subjective performance pay is still preferred when the supervisor is sufficiently
more effective than the performance measure, and vice versa. As the right-hand side
of (21) can only take values between 12 and 2, it follows that subjective performance
pay is always preferred to objective performance pay when p > 2q, whereas subjective
performance pay is always preferred if q > 2p. Figure 1 gives the preferred type of
performance pay for given values of η, ϕ, p, and q.19
4 Subjective and objective performance pay combined
Now consider the case where both objective and subjective performance measures are
available. This has several implications. First, the supervisor can pull the agent away
from following the bias inherent in the objective performance measure. Intuitively, she
will pull the agent closer to her own optimal effort ratio. Second, the principal may
be able to use the objective performance measure to constrain the supervisor. Third,
objectively measured performance gives the supervisor additional information on the
agent’s effort. This reduces the agent’s opportunities to shirk and, hence, his rents.
We first establish several general features of the optimal contract.
Lemma 1 The optimal contract is a forcing contract, where the agent receives compen-
sation unless either objectively measured performance m differs from a pre-determined
target m or the supervisor reports bad performance rB.
19It is also possible to interpret Figure 1 as a comparison between supervisors who differ in bias and
effectiveness.
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Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
To understand Lemma 1, consider first a supervisor with the same bias as the ob-
jective performance measure, η = ϕ. The use of objective performance pay leads to an
outcome where e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ , as this effort ratio allows the agent to reach a given level of
measured performance m at minimal effort cost (see (PMR)). Adding subjective perfor-
mance pay does not affect this bias, as the supervisor also prefers to induce this effort
ratio (given η = ϕ, see (SR)). There is still a benefit to the principal of conditioning
the agent’s pay on both objectively measured performance and subjective performance
evaluation, as it yields the highest probability of detecting a shirking agent. The forcing
contract minimizes the agent’s rents. This benefit of combining objective and subjec-
tive performance evaluation carries over when the supervisor’s preferences differ from
the bias in the objective performance measure, i.e. when η 6= ϕ. Then, the supervisor
uses any subjectively determined bonus to pull the agent towards her own preferred
effort ratio. By conditioning the payout of the subjective bonus on objectively measured
performance, the principal also constrains the supervisor. Denying the agent the bonus
despite a positive report if measured performance does not meet a pre-determined target
m reduces the supervisor’s power to demand efforts that fall short of the target.
A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that there is no clear separation between objective
and subjective performance pay. Optimally, the agent’s compensation depends on both
objectively measured performance as well as the supervisor’s subjectively determined
report. For instance, the contract could have verifiable performance pay b(m 6= m) = 0
and b(m) > 0, with the ‘disqualifier’ that the bonus is forfeit after a bad subjective
evaluation: c(m, rB) = −b(m) and c(m, rG) = 0 for all m. Alternatively, the contract
could have subjective performance pay c(m, rB) = 0 and c(m, rG) > 0, coupled with
b(m = m) = 0 and b(m 6= m) = −c(m, r) for all m and r.20 Given that the agent receives
the same bonus for meeting both the performance target and the supervisor’s request,
20Note that for both types of contract, the agent’s limited liability constraint implies that total com-
pensation can never be negative.
19
both contracts provide the same incentives at equal cost. In the analysis below, we use
the latter type of contract, which is without loss of generality. For ease of notation,
below we denote c(m, rG) = c.
Before deriving the optimal contract, we first establish that not all possible effort
allocations can be implemented through the combination of objective and subjective
performance pay.
Lemma 2 If η > ϕ (η < ϕ), effort allocations such that e2e1 >
1−ϕ
ϕ (
e2
e1
< 1−ϕϕ ) cannot
be implemented.
Proof. In this proof, we focus on the case where η > ϕ. The case η < ϕ is the mirror
image. Consider any combination of (subjective) performance pay c and performance
target m by the principal, and requested efforts e1 and e2 by the supervisor, such that the
agent receives the bonus unless r = rB or m 6= m. Several outcomes are possible. First,
the agent can ignore both the principal’s target and the supervisor’s request. Then,
optimal effort is zero. Second, if the agent ignores the supervisor’s request but adheres
to the principal’s target m = m, the agent’s optimal effort allocation has e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ (see
(PMR)). Third, the supervisor can ignore the principal’s target and induce the agent to
follow her request. When ignoring the target, the supervisor’s optimal effort allocation
is such that e2e1 =
1−η
η <
1−ϕ
ϕ (see (SR)), where the inequality sign follows from η > ϕ.
Lastly, the agent can follow the supervisor’s request while the supervisor adheres to
the principal’s target. In the latter situation, the supervisor’s demands must meet the
agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. Using the agent’s utility function (2), this
constraint is given by:
c− 1
2
e1
2 − 1
2
e2
2 ≥ max
{
(1− p)(1− q)c, (1− p)c− 1
2
1
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m
2
}
(22)
The first term in braces is the agent’s expected utility when exerting no effort at all.
The second term in braces is the agent’s expected utility when reaching m = m at
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lowest effort cost as given by effort levels (6) and (7), i.e. by choosing the performance
measure effort ratio (PMR). It follows that if the agent can be induced to exert any
effort allocation on m = m, an effort allocation such that e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ is also feasible.
A straightforward extension of the analysis in Section 3.2 yields that the principal can
implement effort allocations satisfying e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ by setting c =
1
2
(p+(1−p)q)m2
ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2 . Keeping
m constant, an increase in c makes different effort allocations on m = m feasible. As
η > ϕ, the supervisor prefers effort allocations on m = m with more e1 over effort
allocations with less e1. Hence, the supervisor optimally requests an effort allocation on
m such that e2e1 ≤
1−ϕ
ϕ . Summarizing, none of these outcomes has
e2
e1
> 1−ϕϕ .
Lemma 2 is illustrated by Figure 2, for the case where η > ϕ. The figure depicts
the m = m performance target which runs orthogonal to the line representing the per-
formance measure’s effort ratio (PMR), as well as the set of points where the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) given by (22) is binding. The supervisor can
only implement effort allocations on the m = m line below the ICC, as indicated by
the thicker line segment. This line segment always includes the effort ratio on the line
(PMR), as this is the effort ratio that yields m = m at minimal effort cost. The supervi-
sor’s indifference lines run orthogonal to the line representing the supervisor’s preferred
effort ratio (SR). If η > ϕ, these indifference lines are steeper than the m = m line.
Hence, the supervisor prefers to implement an effort allocation given by the intersection
between the m = m line and the ICC with the highest e1. This implies that the principal
cannot induce the supervisor to request an effort allocation that lies beyond line (PMR)
from the supervisor’s perspective, as given m = m and η > ϕ the supervisor always
prefers an effort ratio e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ over effort ratio’s such that
e2
e1
> 1−ϕϕ . Similarly, if
η < ϕ, the supervisor always prefers to induce effort ratio e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ over effort ratio’s
such that e2e1 <
1−ϕ
ϕ .
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Figure 2: An example with η = 3
5
and ϕ = 2
5
. The feasible set of demands for
the supervisor is given by the bold chord, which is always centered around (PMR).
Lowering m or raising the ICC can lengthen this chord.
Lemma 2 underlines an important difference between objective and subjective per-
formance evaluation. If the supervisor would be a second verifiable performance measure
with bias η 6= ϕ, any effort allocation would have been feasible, as shown by Datar et
al (2001). This holds even when the two measures are biased in the same direction. By
punishing too high performance on the most biased measure combined with rewarding
high performance on the least-biased measure, the agent could be induced to choose
effort allocations that are less biased than the least-biased performance measure. Here,
however, the supervisor can use her discretionary power to make the agent choose an
effort allocation closer to her optimal ratio, as she subjectively determines whether the
agent’s performance is good or bad. Hence, if the supervisor is more biased than the
verifiable performance measure (η > ϕ > 12 or
1
2 > ϕ > η), the supervisor uses any lee-
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way to increase the distortion in efforts. It follows that in this situation, the least-biased
effort ratio that can be implemented is given by the performance measure’s effort ratio
(PMR), e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ .
It is possible to implement effort allocations beyond the supervisor’s preferred effort
ratio (SR), i.e. to implement e2e1 <
1−η
η when η > ϕ and vice versa, although it requires
commitment to penalize too high verifiable performance. This can be easily inferred
from Figure 2: by raising c, the ICC can be shifted up such that the intersection be-
tween the m = m line and the agent’s ICC lies to the right of the line representing the
supervisor’s preferred effort ratio (SR). Then, the supervisor would prefer to request the
effort allocation given by the intersection of the ICC with (SR). However, this would
generate measured performance m > m, implying that with probability q the principal
would not pay out the bonus even when the agent would follow the supervisor’s request.
Anticipating this, the agent would not accept the supervisor’s request, given that q is
sufficiently high q. The best feasible effort allocation for the supervisor is again where
the ICC intersects the m = m line with highest e1, which implies that
e2
e1
< 1−ηη .
Figure 2 also helps to build intuition for the results that follow. A precise perfor-
mance measure (high q) allows the principal to enforce a particular level of objectively
measured performance m at low cost. This restricts the supervisor, who cannot simply
implement an effort allocation with her most-preferred effort ratio (SR), as was possible
in the absence of the verifiable performance measure (Section 3.3). Yet, the performance
measure also helps imperfect supervisors by increasing the chance that a shirking agent
is caught. This allows supervisors to request higher effort levels for a given discretionary
bonus c.
If monitoring or performance measurement is sufficiently imperfect, two additional
constraints arise. First, if the supervisor’s effectiveness is sufficiently low, it becomes
attractive for the agent to only pretend to abide by the supervisor’s request. Instead,
the agent could obtain the same level of measured performance m = m(e1, e2) at lower
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cost by choosing efforts along the performance measure’s effort ratio (PMR). Second,
if the performance measure is sufficiently imprecise, the supervisor is tempted to ignore
the principal’s target m = m and request effort levels along her preferred effort ratio
(SR). The optimal contract depends on whether these constraints are binding.
Propositions 1 to 4 below give the optimal contract, differentiated by whether or not
these constraints are binding. We focus on the case where η > ϕ, the case of η < ϕ is
the mirror image.
Proposition 1 Given η > ϕ, the optimal contract induces balanced effort e1 = e2 if and
only if (i) ϕ ≤ 12 and (ii) 1(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) ≥ p ≥ q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 .
Under these conditions, the optimal contract has c = m = (p+ (1− p) q), b(m = m) = 0,
and b(m 6= m) = −c.
The equilibrium effort levels are e1 = e2 = (p+ (1− p) q).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 gives the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the princi-
pal can induce balanced efforts. The outcome is as if the principal has access to an
unbiased performance measure that is as effective as the supervisor and the verifiable
measure combined. Condition (i) follows from Lemma 2: the principal cannot induce
the supervisor to implement balanced efforts when the supervisor is more biased than
the verifiable performance measure. Condition (ii) implies that the effectiveness of the
supervisor and the performance measure should not be too different. If the supervisor’s
effectiveness p is too low, the agent is tempted to feign satisfying the supervisor’s de-
mands by generating m = m(e1, e2) at lower cost along the PMR. The supervisor cannot
use the objective performance measure to detect this breach of the implicit agreement.
This is more attractive to the agent when the effectiveness of the performance measure
(supervisor) is larger (smaller). The benefits of this deviation for the agent are larger
when the performance measure is more biased. In contrast, if the performance measure
is relatively ineffective, the supervisor may have an incentive to ignore the performance
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target m. A less effective objective performance measure makes it less likely that the
principal detects such a deviation, which increases the incentive of the agent to follow
the supervisor in deviating. Deviating is more beneficial for more biased supervisors.
The following Propositions describe the optimal outcomes when the conditions in
Proposition 1 are not met. Proposition 2 considers the case where ϕ > 12 , while Propo-
sitions 3 and 4 consider the cases where p and q are too different.
Proposition 2 Given η > ϕ > 12 , the principal optimally induces efforts along the PMR
( e2e1 =
1−ϕ
ϕ ), if and only if p ≤ q(1−q) (ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))
2
(η−ϕ)2 .
Under these conditions, the optimal contract has c = (p+(1−p)q)
2(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2) , m = (p+ (1− p) q),
b(m = m) = 0, and b(m 6= m) = −c.
The equilibrium effort levels are e1 = (p+ (1− p) q) ϕ(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2) and e2 = (p+ (1− p) q)
1−ϕ
(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2) .
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Figure 3 gives an example of this situation. Given η > ϕ > 12 , the supervisor uses any
available room to move away from the PMR to distort the agent’s efforts even further
away from the principal’s objectives. Hence, it is optimal for the principal to constrain
the supervisor to the PMR. Compared to the case where ϕ ≤ 12 , the principal demands
the same measured performance m, but sets a smaller bonus. Thereby, the principal
makes it impossible for the supervisor to request effort levels that are more biased than
the verifiable performance measure. Even though this implies that the supervisor does
not mitigate the bias inherent in the objective performance measure, she still adds value
for the principal. The supervisor provides additional monitoring, which allows for a
reduction in the rents left to the agent. The resulting outcome is as if the principal has
access to a biased performance measure as effective as the supervisor and the verifiable
measure combined. The only constraint on the outcome is that the supervisor should
not be tempted to ignore the target. As before, this happens when the verifiable measure
is sufficiently imprecise relative to the effectiveness of the supervisor, and is more likely
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when the PMR and the SR are more apart.21
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Figure 3: An example with η = 4
5
and ϕ = 3
5
. The feasible set of demands for the
supervisor is given by the bold chord, which is always centered around (PMR). Even
though balanced efforts are feasible here the supervisor prefers to induce highly
distorted efforts. Hence, the principal is better off raising m to the intersection
between (PMR)and the ICC.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, it follows that if p and q are sufficiently large,
the supervisor’s bias only affects whether balanced efforts can be implemented. Other
than that, neither the optimal contract nor equilibrium efforts depend on the bias of the
supervisor. The following proposition describes the optimal contract when the supervisor
is (relatively) ineffective.
Proposition 3 Suppose η > ϕ and ϕ ≤ 12 . If p < q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , the optimal contract
induces unbalanced efforts biased towards the PMR, e2e1 > 1.
21As the contract in Proposition 2 implements effort levels that meet the principal’s performance
target m at minimal effort costs, the agent never benefits from choosing different effort levels while still
generating measured performance m.
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Under these conditions, the optimal contract has c =
(√
(1−p)q+(1−2ϕ)√p
)2
2(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2) , m = (1 −
p)q + (1− 2ϕ)√p(1− p)q, b(m = m) = 0, and b(m 6= m) = −c.
The equilibrium effort levels are e1 =
(√
(1−p)q+(1−2ϕ)√p
)
ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2
(
ϕ
√
(1− p)q + (1− ϕ)√p
)
and e2 =
(√
(1−p)q+(1−2ϕ)√p
)
ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2
(
(1− ϕ)√(1− p)q − ϕ√p).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
If the supervisor is ineffective, the agent is tempted to feign compliance by meeting
the performance target m = m at minimal effort cost rather than by following the
supervisor’s request. The optimal deviation would be to choose the effort ratio equal to
the performance measure’s ratio as given by (PMR). Feigning compliance is particularly
attractive for the agent when the performance measure is both highly effective and highly
biased while the supervisor is weak. Anticipating the agent’s incentive to deviate, the
supervisor is forced to shift her requested effort levels closer to the PMR. This increases
the agent’s rents, as can be seen from Figure 2.
The principal optimally responds to this inefficiency in two ways. First, he sets a
higher performance target m as compared to the case with a more effective supervisor.
While this forces the supervisor to request a biased effort ratio closer to the PMR,
it also reduces the agent’s rents when feigning compliance, which makes following the
supervisor’s request relatively more attractive. Second, as the implemented effort levels
remain biased toward the PMR, the principal lowers the bonus. Hence, compared to
the case with a more effective supervisor (Proposition 1), the bonus is smaller while the
performance target is higher.
The imbalance in the effort levels is decreasing in supervisor effectiveness p and
increasing in the bias of the verifiable performance measure |12 − ϕ|.22 Provided that
the supervisor is not more biased than the verifiable performance measure (η > ϕ and
ϕ ≤ 12), the supervisor’s bias is irrelevant. For the principal, this implies that if only
22Note that if p = 0, the equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium derived in subsection 3.2 where
only a verifiable performance measure was available.
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weak supervisors are available, their bias is not a concern. This differs when supervisors
are relatively strong, as shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Suppose η > ϕ. If p > 1
(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) and ϕ ≤ 12 , or if p > (ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))
2
(η−ϕ)2
q
(1−q)
and ϕ > 12 , the optimal contract induces unbalanced efforts biased towards the SR.
Under these conditions, the optimal contract has c =
(√
p(1−q)+|1−2η|√q
)2
2(η2+(1−η)2) , b(m = m) =
0, and b(m 6= m) = −c.
If η > 12 , m = λ
(
(ηϕ+ (1− η) (1− ϕ))√p (1− q) + (η − ϕ)√q) and equilibrium effort
levels are e1 = λ
(
η
√
p (1− q)− (1− η)√q
)
and e2 = λ
(
(1− η)√p (1− q) + η√q),
where λ =
(√
p(1−q)+|1−2η|√q
)
(η2+(1−η)2) .
If η < 12 , m = λ
(
(ηϕ+ (1− η) (1− ϕ))√p (1− q)− (η − ϕ)√q) and equilibrium effort
levels are e1 = λ
(
η
√
p (1− q) + (1− η)√q
)
and e2 = λ
(
(1− η)√p (1− q)− η√q).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
When the verifiable performance measure is ineffective, strong supervisors have an
incentive to ignore the performance target m and deviate to their most-preferred effort
ratio (SR). This reduces the agent’s incentives, as it implies that the agent’s bonus
is forfeit if the performance measure provides a signal. However, if this probability q
is small enough, the supervisor is still better off inducing the agent to allocate efforts
along the SR. Figure 4 depicts this situation. The solid ICC curve gives the effort
allocations the supervisor could induce provided that the penalty b(m 6= m) would never
be incurred, while the dashed ICC gives all implementable effort allocations if penalty
b(m 6= m) is incurred with probability q. From the supervisor’s perspective, the best
feasible effort allocation implementingm = m is the rightmost point on the thick segment
of the m = m line. However, given that the supervisor is very effective compared to the
verifiable measure, she can induce efforts off the m = m line that yield her higher utility,
as depicted by the shaded area. Optimally, she would induce the agent to choose the
effort levels determined by the intersection of the SR and the dashed ICC.
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Figure 4: An example with η = 4
5
and ϕ = 1
5
. For relatively low q, it is feasible and
optimal for the supervisor to ignore m = m, as shown by the shaded area.
Anticipating the supervisor’s incentive to deviate, the principal optimally adjusts the
contract. First, given bonus c, the principal adjusts the performance target m such that
the supervisor can induce the agent to meet m = m with an effort allocation closer to SR.
Given that η > ϕ, this adjustment is upward (downward) when η < 12 (η >
1
2). Second,
as the implemented effort ratio is distorted, the principal optimally sets a smaller bonus.
Proposition 4 shows that a weak performance measure not only hampers the provision
of incentives to the agent, but also makes monitoring the supervisor difficult. Strong
supervisors use their information advantage to induce efforts that are biased towards
their most-preferred task. To mitigate this problem, the principal must accommodate to
the supervisor’s preferences.23 Given q, the imbalance in equilibrium efforts is increasing
23Note that if q = 0, the equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium derived in subsection 3.3 where
only subjective performance evaluation was available. For q = 0, the (irrelevant) performance target m
simply gives the performance as measured given the agent’s efforts.
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in p. However, this does not imply that the principal would prefer a less effective
supervisor when verifiable performance measures are weak. Effective supervisors also
reduce the agent’s rents, which in turn makes implementing higher efforts more attractive
to the principal. This positive effect on efficiency dominates the negative effect of a more
biased outcome. Given supervisor effectiveness p, an increase in the supervisor’s bias
harms the principal.
The following proposition gives an overview of the comparative statics of all pa-
rameters on the optimal level of bonus pay and on the principal’s payoff, for all cases
considered above combined. As our linear-quadratic framework implies that the princi-
pal’s payoff is equal to the agent’s bonus pay, these comparative statics are identical.
Proposition 5 Given η > ϕ, comparative statics on the optimal level of bonus pay and
the principal’s equilibrium payoff are as follows:
(i)
∂Up
∂p =
∂c
∂p ≥ 0, with equality only if q = 1.
(ii)
∂Up
∂q =
∂c
∂q ≥ 0, with equality only if p = 1.
(iii)
∂Up
∂ϕ =
∂c
∂ϕ ≥ 0 if ϕ < 12 , with equality only if p ≥ q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , and
∂Up
∂ϕ =
∂c
∂ϕ ≤ 0 if
ϕ > 12 , with equality only if p >
(ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))2
(η−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) .
(iv)
∂Up
∂η =
∂c
∂η ≥ 0 if η < 12 , with equality only if p ≤ 1(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) , and
∂Up
∂η =
∂c
∂η ≤ 0
if η > 12 , with equality only if ϕ <
1
2 and p ≤ 1(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) or if ϕ >
1
2 and p <
(ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))2
(η−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) .
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
To summarize our findings above, we find that the principal always benefits from
more effective performance measurement and supervision. Both reduce the agent’s rents
and allow for stronger incentive pay. As the agent’s rents in equilibrium depend on the
probability that either the supervisor observes the agent’s efforts or the principal receives
a verifiable performance measure, the effectiveness of the supervisor and the verifiable
measure are substitutes. A biased supervisor need not be detrimental to the principal,
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provided that the principal has access to a verifiable performance measure that is suffi-
ciently effective and the supervisor is either less biased than the verifiable performance
measure or biased towards the other task.24. However, when the verifiable performance
measure is relatively weak, a biased supervisor forces the principal to accommodate to
her preferences, leading to lower optimal incentive pay. Similarly, a biased performance
measure is not problematic as long as the supervisor is sufficiently effective. If not, the
agent’s incentive to ignore the supervisor leads to an allocation of efforts biased towards
the task that receives most weight in the performance measure.
The following proposition establishes that the principal is always better off combining
subjective and objective performance evaluation compared to using only subjective or
only objective performance evaluation. Combined evaluation always reduces the agent’s
rents, which benefits the principal. Furthermore, if both subjective and objective per-
formance measurement are sufficiently effective, as studied in Propositions 1 and 2,
combined evaluation can eliminate the bias that might arise when only using objective
or subjective performance evaluation. On the other hand, if p and q are sufficiently dif-
ferent, combined evaluation might increase the bias as compared to using only objective
or only subjective performance evaluation. Still, for all performance measures and all
supervisors, the cost implied by the extra bias is outweighed by the benefits that arise
from better monitoring of the agent. This result is close to Datar et al. (2001), who show
that the use of an extra verifiable performance measure that increases incongruence is
nevertheless optimal as long as it allows for more precise measurement of the agent’s
efforts.25
24It is possible to affect the supervisor’s bias by offering a bonus to the supervisor based on measured
performance m. Effectively, this would draw the supervisor’s relative preferences over tasks closer to
PMR. From Proposition 5, it follows that this benefits the principal only when the performance measure
is relatively weak and less biased or biased towards the opposite task as the supervisor. However, given
the supervisor’s limited liability, providing a bonus to the supervisor is highly costly precisely when the
verifiable measure is weak. Hence, incentive pay for the supervisor based on the agent’s performance is
of little use to the principal.
25We have assumed that the (fixed) cost of obtaining both the objective and the subjective performance
measure is zero. If these costs are positive, a trade-off naturally arises.
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Proposition 6 When p > 0 and q > 0, the principal benefits from combining subjective
and objective performance evaluation.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
5 Generalists versus specialists as supervisors
We use our results to discuss the principal’s trade-off when choosing between different
supervisors. In particular, we consider the choice between a specialist and a generalist.
We assume that a specialist is more effective in monitoring the agent than a generalist,
pS > pG, where subscript S (G) denotes specialist (generalist). However, the specialist
has stronger preferences regarding the execution of the tasks than the generalist. We
assume that the generalist has unbiased preferences, ηG =
1
2 , while the specialist has
biased preferences ηS 6= 12 . This combination of expertise and bias corresponds to
findings by Li (2013), who looks at decision made by reviewers of grant proposals at
the US National Institute of Health. She finds that reviewers are better able to judge
the quality of proposals in their own area, but that they are also biased in favour of
proposals in their own area. While the relation between grant reviewers and potential
grant recipients differs from the relation between managers and employees, the reviewers
decide about resource allocation across different fields, much like the supervisor in our
model.
To determine whether the principal prefers a generalist or a specialist in the absence
of verifiable performance measures, we can directly use the principal’s payoff under pure
discretionary pay (20). It follows that the principal prefers the specialist manager if
pS
pG
> 2
(
(1− ηS)2 + η2S
)
(23)
Hence, in choosing between a specialist and a generalist, the principal faces a trade-
off between more effective supervision and more distorted effort levels. The principal
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tolerates the bias of the specialist only if she is sufficiently more effective than the
generalist.
Now suppose that the principal has access to a verifiable performance measure. With-
out loss of generality, we focus on the case where ηS >
1
2 and ηS > ϕ. Better performance
measurement (higher q) affects the choice between the generalist and the specialist in
two ways. First, the marginal benefit to the principal of a better supervisor is smaller, as
the effectiveness of subjective and objective performance measurement are substitutes.
Second, the principal can use the verifiable performance measure to neutralize or at
least mitigate the bias that is induced by the specialist supervisor. The latter effect
dominates, unless the specialist’s bias cannot be fully eliminated.
Combining Propositions 1, 3, and 5, we have that if ϕ ≤ 12 and pS < 1(1−2ηS)2
q
(1−q)
the supervisor’s bias is irrelevant while the principal benefits from more effective supervi-
sion. It follows that the principal prefers the specialist: when the verifiable performance
measure is sufficiently effective and biased towards the opposite task as compared to
the specialist, the principal can neutralize the specialist’s bias while obtaining the ben-
efits from better supervision. On the other hand, if the objective measure is relatively
weak, the principal is forced to accommodate towards the specialist’s bias. If the bias
of the specialist is sufficiently strong while she is only slightly more effective, the prin-
cipal prefers the generalist (in the limit where q = 0, this condition is given by (23)).
Interestingly, if ϕ > 12 and the verifiable measure is sufficiently strong, the bias induced
by a specialist supervisor is the bias of the verifiable performance measure. In this
case, a more aligned objective performance measure (ϕ closer to 12) makes the special-
ist more attractive, whereas a more effective objective performance measure (higher q)
increases the relative attractiveness of the generalist. These results are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Consider the principal’s choice of supervisor between a specialist and a
generalist, where ηS > ηG =
1
2 and pS > pG. The principal prefers the specialist over
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the generalist, unless (i) ηS > ϕ >
1
2 and pS <
(ηSϕ+(1−ηS)(1−ϕ))2
(ηS−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) or (ii) pG >
1
(1−2ηS)2
q
(1−q) . In case (i), if pG ≥ q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , the principal prefers the generalist if and
only if pS − pG < (1− 2ϕ)2
(
q
(1−q) + pG
)
, while if pG <
q(1−2ϕ)2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , the principal prefers
the generalist if and only if pS−pG < 2
√
pG
(1−q)
(
(2ϕ− 1)√(1− pG)q − 2ϕ (1− ϕ)√pG). In
case (ii), the principal prefers the generalist if and only if pS−pG <
(
(2η−1)√pS−
√
q
(1−q)
)2
2(η2+(1−η)2) .
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
6 Concluding remarks
We have studied the effects of biased supervision in a three-tier hierarchy. Supervisors
can influence their subordinates’ effort allocation across tasks by (ab)using their dis-
cretion in determining subjective performance evaluations. This allows supervisors to
direct their subordinates towards activities that have relatively high value for the su-
pervisor but not necessarily for the organization. Biased supervision is detrimental for
organizations in the absence of other performance measures, as it leads to misallocation
of agents’ effort across tasks. However, this negative effect of supervisor bias is mitigated
when the principal can also use a verifiable performance measure, even when the latter
is highly incongruent. A biased supervisor will use her discretionary powers to direct her
agents away from the distortion inherent in the verifiable performance measure, towards
tasks she considers more important. At the same time, the principal can use verifiable
performance targets to constrain the supervisor. We have shown that the optimal level
of incentive pay for employees is decreasing in supervisor bias only when the verifiable
performance measure is weak.
We have derived the optimal contract assuming that the supervisor’s bias and ability
are observed by the principal. If the supervisor’s type is unobservable and supervisors
self-select into organizations, a given contract is most attractive to supervisors with
high-ability and with a bias close to the bias of the verifiable performance measure.
34
This implies that in determining performance targets and the supervisor’s discretion,
the principal faces a trade-off between attracting aligned but low-ability supervisors and
attracting high-ability but more biased supervisors. The effects of (incentive) wages on
the self-selection of workers based on intrinsic motivation and/or ability is studied by
e.g. Handy and Katz (1998), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008,
2010), Prendergast (2007), and Dal Bo et al. (2013). How self-selection of managers is
affected by the degree of discretion over their subordinates’ activities is an interesting
question that we leave for future work.
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A Appendix
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1] Suppose the principal wants to induce some efforts e∗ =
{e∗1, e∗2}, which would lead to measured performance m = m. First, suppose the super-
visor also wants to induce e∗. Exerting effort e∗ yields agent’s expected utility
UA(e
∗) = pqwA(m, rG)+p(1−q)wA(∅, rG)+(1−p)qwA(m, rG)+(1−p)(1−q)wA(∅, rG)−1
2
(e∗1)
2−1
2
(e∗2)
2
Provided that maxmwA(m, rG) = wA(m, rG), assumption (5) implies wA(∅, rG) = wA(m, rG),
so that we can rewrite this to
UA(e
∗) = wA(m, rG)− 1
2
(e∗1)
2 − 1
2
(e∗2)
2 (A1)
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The agent’s rents (the difference between wage wA(m, rG) and the agent’s effort cost)
are determined by maxe UA(e
−∗), where UA(e−∗) represents the agent’s expected utility
after choosing any efforts e 6= e∗. For any e 6= e∗ such that m 6= m, we have
UA(e
−∗) = qwA(m 6= m, rB)+p(1−q)wA(∅, rB)+(1−p)(1−q)wA(m, rG)−1
2
(
e−∗1
)2−1
2
(
e−∗2
)2
(A2)
while for any e 6= e∗ such that m = m, we have
UA(e
−∗) = pqwA(m, rB) + p(1− q)wA(∅, rB) + (1− p)wA(m, rG)− 1
2
(
e−∗1
)2 − 1
2
(
e−∗2
)2
It follows that the agent’s rents maxe UA(e
−∗) are minimal when wA(m 6= m, rB) =
wA(m, rB) = wA(∅, rB) = 0. Hence, after a bad report, the agent’s wage is optimally
zero, independent of measured performance m.
Next, consider the supervisor’s incentive to demand eS 6= e∗. First, consider any eS
yielding m = m. In terms of measured performance, the principal cannot distinguish
between eS and e∗. As a result, the effect of the wage scheme on the agent’s incentive to
exert eS is identical to the incentive to exert e∗ as discussed above. Hence, if effort cost
at e∗ are at least as large as effort cost at eS , the principal cannot prevent the supervisor
from inducing eS . Second, consider any eS yielding m = mS 6= m. Exerting eS gives the
agent expected utility
UA(e
S) = qwA(m 6= m, rG) + (1− q)wA(∅, rG)− 1
2
(
eS1
)2 − 1
2
(
eS2
)2
(A3)
Not following the supervisor’s demand and exerting e 6= eS such that m 6= mS and
m 6= m yields expected utility to the agent equal to
UA(e 6= eS) = qwA(m 6= m, rB)+p(1−q)wA(∅, rB)+(1−p)(1−q)wA(∅, rG)−1
2
(e1)
2−1
2
(e2)
2
(A4)
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while exerting e 6= eS such that m = m 6= mS yields utility
UA(e 6= eS) = qwA(m, rB)+p(1−q)wA(∅, rB)+(1−p)(1−q)wA(∅, rG)− 1
2
(e1)
2− 1
2
(e2)
2
Lastly, the agent can exert e 6= eS such that m = mS , which yields utility
UA(e 6= eS) = pqwA(m 6= m, rB) + p(1− q)wA(∅, rB) + (1− p)qwA(m 6= m, rG) +
+(1− p)(1− q)wA(∅, rG)− 1
2
(e1)
2 − 1
2
(e2)
2
The set of eS the supervisor can demand increases in the difference between UA(e
S)
and maxeUA(e 6= eS). Hence, the principal wants to minimize this difference. It is
not possible to set wA(m 6= m, rB) > wA(m 6= m, rG) or wA(∅, rB) > wA(∅, rG), as
the cheap talk nature of the reports implies that the supervisor would increase the
set eS by switching the report labels. Hence, it is optimal for the principal to set
wA(m 6= m, rG) = wA(m 6= m, rB) = 0. It follows that the agent’s wage is optimally
zero if m 6= m, regardless of the supervisor’s report.
By assumption (5), it follows from (A1) that wA(∅, rG) = 0 is not possible as the
agent’s incentives to exert e∗ are derived from wA(m, rG) > 0. Lastly, we show that
wA(m, rB) = wA(∅, rB) > 0 does not affect the supervisor’s decision to induce eS
rather than e∗. We focus on the case where the agent’s best alternative to following
the supervisor’s demand is an effort allocation such that m 6= m. The case where the
best alternative yields m = m is analog and therefore omitted. If the agent decides
not to follow the supervisor’s demands (either e∗ or eS), it follows from substituting
for wA(m 6= m, rG) = wA(m 6= m, rB) = 0, wA(∅, rG) = wA(m, rG), and wA(∅, rB) =
wA(m, rB) into (A2) and (A4) that exerting e1 = e2 = 0 is optimal. Using (A1), it
follows that to demand e∗, wA(m, rG) and wA(m, rB) have to be such that
(p(1− q) + q)wA(m, rG)− 1
2
(e∗1)
2 − 1
2
(e∗2)
2 ≥ p(1− q)wA(m, rB) (A5)
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Both the principal and the supervisor are best off when these equations hold with equal-
ity. Suppose that e∗ is such that e
∗
2
e∗1
= 1−κκ , for any κ ∈ [0, 1]. By (A5), this implies
that e∗1 = κ
√
2 (p(1− q) + q)wA(m, rG)− 2p(1− q)wA(m, rB) and e∗2 = 1−κκ e∗1. Using
supervisor’s utility (4), a supervisor with bias η derives utility from inducing e∗ equal to
US(e
∗) = (ηκ+ (1− η) (1− κ))
√
2 (p(1− q) + q)wA(m, rG)− 2p(1− q)wA(m, rB)
Similarly, using (A3), it follows that the supervisor can demand eS if
p(1− q)wA(m, rG)− 1
2
(
eS1
)2 − 1
2
(
eS2
)2 ≥ p(1− q)wA(m, rB)
By (SR), a supervisor with bias η will optimally induce the agent to exert efforts such
that
eS2
eS1
= 1−ηη , leading to e
S
1 = η
√
2p(1− q) (wA(m, rG)− wA(m, rB)) and eS2 = 1−ηη eS1 .
Using (4), this yields
US(e
S) =
(
η2 + (1− η)2
)√
2p(1− q) (wA(m, rG)− wA(m, rB))
The supervisor prefers to induce eS rather than e∗ if US(e∗) < US(eS). Now consider an
increase in wA(m, rB). This gives
∂US(e
∗)
∂wA(m, rB)
= − (ηκ+ (1− η) (1− κ)) p(1− q)√
2 (p(1− q) + q)wA(m, rG)− 2p(1− q)wA(m, rB)
∂US(e
S)
∂wA(m, rB)
= −
(
η2 + (1− η)2
) p(1− q)√
2p(1− q) (wA(m, rG)− wA(m, rB))
It follows that if US(e
∗) < US(eS), we also have
∂US(e
∗)
∂wA(m,rB)
< ∂US(e
S)
∂wA(m,rB)
. If the supervisor
prefers some feasible eS over e∗, an increase in wA(m, rB) (and, hence, wA(∅, rB)) does
not induce the supervisor to demand e∗. Hence, given that the agent’s rents increases
in wA(m, rB) as shown above, it is optimal to set wA(m, rB) = wA(∅, rB) = 0. After a
bad report, the agent optimally receives no pay, regardless of measured performance.
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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] Condition (i) follows from Lemma 2, while verifiable
performance pay b(m = m) = 0 and b(m 6= m) = −c follows from Lemma 1. Let ϕ ≤ 12 .
Given c, m, b(m = m) = 0, and b(m 6= m) = −c, the supervisor maximizes utility
(4) with respect to requested effort levels e1 and e2, subject to the agent’s incentive
compatibility constraint. If the supervisor requests effort levels that yield m = m, this
constraint is given by (22). If the first term between braces in (22) is larger than the
second term, the supervisor optimally requests
e1 =
ϕ
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m+
(1− ϕ)
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q) c−m2(A6)
e2 =
(1− ϕ)
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m−
ϕ
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q) c−m2(A7)
Anticipating this, the principal maximizes utility (1) with respect to c and m. The
first-order conditions for c and m are, respectively, given by
(1− 2ϕ) (p+ (1− p) q)√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q) c−m2
− 1 = 0
1
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
1− (1− 2ϕ)m√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q) c−m2
 = 0
This can be solved for c = m = (p+ (1− p) q). Substituting for c and m in (A6) and
(A7) yields effort levels e1 = e2 = (p+ (1− p) q).
This solution is not attainable if the agent prefers to feign compliance to the su-
pervisor request by generating m = m at lower effort cost through effort levels along
the performance measure’s effort ratio (PMR). This arises if the second term between
braces in (22) is larger than the first term. Substituting for c and m yields condition
p ≥ q(1−2ϕ)2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 . The second condition on p follows from the supervisor’s incentive to
ignore performance target m and request effort levels along her preferred effort ratio
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(SR). When ignoring m, the supervisor optimally requests
e1 = η
√
2p (1− q) c
η2 + (1− η)2 (A8)
e2 = (1− η)
√
2p (1− q) c
η2 + (1− η)2 (A9)
where we have used that the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint is now given by
(1− q) c− 1
2
e1
2 − 1
2
e2
2 ≥ (1− q) (1− p) c
Note that the agent cannot feign compliance in this case, as the principal denies the
bonus after learning that m 6= m. Comparing supervisor utility levels from adhering
to and ignoring m gives the following condition under which the supervisor prefers to
adhere to performance target m:
(p+ (1− p) q) ≥
√
2
(
η2 + (1− η)2
)
p (1− q) (p+ (1− p) q)
which can be rewritten to p ≤ 1
(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) as given in the proposition.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 2] By Lemma 2, it is not possible to induce e2e1 >
1−ϕ
ϕ ,
while verifiable performance pay b(m = m) = 0 and b(m 6= m) = −c follows from Lemma
1. For given c and m, the supervisor maximizes utility (4) with respect to requested
effort levels e1 and e2, subject to the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (22).
Assuming the first term between braces in (22) is larger than the second term, the
supervisor optimally requests effort levels as given by (A6) and (A7). Substituting for
e1 and e2 into the principal’s utility (1) gives
UP =
1
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m+
(1− 2ϕ)
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q) c−m2−a−c−ws
(A10)
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By ϕ > 12 , the second term in (A10) is non-positive and decreasing in c. Note that
the second term gives the principal’s benefit of allowing the supervisor to implement an
effort ratio different from (PMR). This implies that the optimal solution must have the
smallest c possible given m, as determined by
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q) c−m2 = 0 (A11)
Using this condition to substitute for c in (A10) and maximizing with respect to m gives
first order condition
1
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 −
m(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q)
= 0
which yields m = (p+ (1− p) q). Substituting for m in (A11) gives c = (p+(1−p)q)
2(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2) ,
and the effort levels follow from substituting for m and c in (A6) and (A7).
As the agent exerts effort levels along the PMR, the two terms between braces in
(22) coincide, implying that feigning compliance by generating m = m with different
effort levels never benefits the agent. The supervisor prefers adhering to the principal’s
demand m = m rather than deviating to the best-possible effort allocation along her
most-preferred effort ratio (SR) when
(ηϕ+ (1− η) (1− ϕ))
√
(p+ (1− p) q) ≥
√(
η2 + (1− η)2
)(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
p (1− q)
where the left-hand side (right-hand side) follows from substituting for the effort levels
(A6) and (A7) ((A8) and (A9)) into the supervisor’s utility (4). Rewriting yields the
condition on p as given in the proposition.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3] If p < q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , the optimal contract derived in
Proposition 1 is not attainable. The agent has an incentive to deviate to the effort levels
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on the performance measure’s effort ratio (PMR) that generate m = m at lower effort
cost (i.e. in the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (22), the second term in braces
is larger than the first). Anticipating this, the supervisor would maximize her utility
(4) with respect to effort requests e1 and e2. Assuming (for now) that the supervisor
requests satisfy performance target m = m, the optimal effort request is given by
e1 =
ϕ
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m+
(1− ϕ)
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
pc
e2 =
(1− ϕ)
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2m−
ϕ
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
pc
implying that given ϕ < 12 , the contract specified in Proposition 1 (with c = m) would
lead to ϕ1−ϕ <
e1
e2
< 1.
This outcome would yield higher rents to the agent than exerting zero effort, as
determined by the first term between braces in (22). It follows that the principal can
achieve the same effort allocation at lower cost by adjusting c and m such that the two
terms between braces in (22) are equal. In other words, the principal is constrained by
the agent’s temptation to resort to effort allocations on the PMR. This constraint is given
by equating the two terms between braces in (22), which yields c = 12(1−p)q
1
ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2m
2.
The optimal contract follows from substituting for effort levels (A6) and (A7) and for c
into the principal’s utility (1) and maximizing with respect to a, m, and ws (as before,
verifiable performance pay b(m = m) = 0 and b(m 6= m) = −c follows from Lemma 1).
The first-order condition for m is given by
1 + (1− 2ϕ)
√
p
(1− p)q −
1
(1− p)qm = 0
This can be rewritten tom = (1−p)q+(1− 2ϕ)√p(1− p)q, yielding c = (√(1−p)q+(1−2ϕ)√p)2
2(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2) .
The effort levels follow from substituting for c into (A6) and (A7). Given that p <
q(1−2ϕ)2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , we have c < p+ (1− p)q < m.
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Lastly, we must show that the supervisor optimally adheres to m = m. The best
deviation is to request effort levels along his preferred effort ratio (SR). In that case,
the agent receives no bonus if the principal observes objective performance m, which
happens with probability q. This implies that the agent’s incentive constraint given
deviation equals
(1− q)c− 1
2
e1
2 − 1
2
e2
2 ≥ (1− q) (1− p) c
Note that if the supervisor deviates, the agent has no incentive to feign compliance
because as m 6= m, the bonus is forfeit if the verifiable measure provides a signal. Given
bonus c, the deviating supervisor optimally requests effort levels
e1 = η
√
2 (1− q) pc
η2 + (1− η)2 (A12)
e2 = (1− η)
√
2 (1− q) pc
η2 + (1− η)2
It is easily derived that given ϕ < 12 , the incentive to deviate is strongest for the super-
visor most biased towards task 1, i.e. with η = 1. Below we show that even supervisors
with η = 1 prefer to adhere to m = m. Given η = 1, this implies that we have to show
that effort in task 1 is lower when the supervisor deviates. Substituting for c, m, and
η = 1 into (A6) and (A12) implies that the supervisor adheres to m = m when
1
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
(
ϕ(1− p)q + (1− 2ϕ2)√p(1− p)q + (1− ϕ) (1− 2ϕ) p) >
(√
(1− p)q + (1− 2ϕ)√p
)√√√√ (1− q) p(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
It can be shown that this expression increases in q. Rewriting condition p < q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 ,
the lowest value of q considered in Proposition 3 is given by q = p
(1−p)(1−2ϕ)2 . Substituting
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for this level of q yields
2p
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(1− 2ϕ)2
(√
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 −
√(
(1− 2ϕ)2 − p
1− p
))
≥ 0
which holds for any ϕ and p, as ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 ≥ (1− 2ϕ)2 given that 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1. Hence,
supervisors optimally adhere to m = m.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4] If ϕ ≤ 12 and p > 1(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) , the optimal contract de-
rived in Proposition 1 is not attainable. Similarly, if ϕ > 12 and p >
(ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))2
(η−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) ,
the optimal contract derived in Proposition 2 is not feasible. In both cases, the supervi-
sor has an incentive to deviate from inducing efforts that would satisfy m = m (i.e. (A6)
and (A7)) to efforts along her most-preferred effort ratio (SR), as given by (A8) and
(A9). Anticipating this, the principal must design a contract that meets the supervisor’s
incentive compatibility constraint:
ηϕ+ (1− η) (1− ϕ)
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2 m+
η − ϕ
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
√
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
(p+ (1− p) q) c−m2 ≥
(A13)√
2
(
η2 + (1− η)2
)
(1− q) pc
where the left-hand side gives the supervisor’s utility when meeting the principal’s target
and the right-hand side gives his utility when ignoring this target, both following from
substituting the effort levels into supervisor utility (4).
As before, verifiable performance pay b(m = m) = 0 and b(m 6= m) = −c follows
from Lemma 1. The optimal contract follows from substituting for effort levels (A6)
and (A7) into the principal’s utility (1) and maximizing with respect to c and m, taking
into account the limited liability constraints and the binding supervisor’s incentive com-
patibility constraint (A13). Solving the Lagrangian gives lengthy first-order conditions,
which, after straightforward (but tedious) rewriting, yield the expressions for c and m
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given in the proposition. Substituting for c and m into effort levels (A6) and (A7) yields
the expressions for e1 and e2.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5] Substituting for a = ws = 0 into the principal’s utility
(1) gives the principal’s equilibrium payoff as Up = e1 + e2 − c. Substituting for the
optimal bonus c and equilibrium effort as given in Propositions 1-4 yields the following
expressions for the principal’s payoff U ip, where the superscript i ∈ [1, 4] indicates the
corresponding proposition (with some abuse of notation):
U1p = p+ (1− p) q
U2p =
p+ (1− p) q
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
U3p =
(√
(1− p)q + (1− 2ϕ)√p
)2
2
(
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ)2
)
U4p =
(√
p (1− q) + |1− 2η|√q
)2
2
(
η2 + (1− η)2
)
Note that all payoffs are identical to the corresponding levels of bonus pay c. Hence, all
comparative statics are identical too.
First, we determine the comparative statics within each proposition.
(i) The (weakly) positive effect of p follows directly for Propositions 1, 2, and 4. For
Proposition 3, we have
∂U3p
∂p
= −
√
pq−(1−2ϕ)
√
(1−p)q
2
√
p
√
(1−p)q > 0, where the sign follows from the
conditions ϕ ≤ 12 and p < q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 under which this Proposition is relevant.
(ii) The (weakly) positive effect of q follows directly for Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
For Proposition 4, we have
∂U4p
∂q
= −
√
qp−(1−2η)
√
p(1−q)
2
√
q
√
p(1−q) > 0, where the sign follows from
the conditions p > 1
(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) or from η > ϕ >
1
2 and p >
(ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))2
(η−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) under
which this Proposition is relevant.
(iii) Under the conditions governing Propositions 1 and 4, ϕ has no effect on Up. In
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Proposition 2, the principal’s payoff is decreasing in the bias |ϕ− 12 |. In Proposition 3,
we have
∂U3p
∂ϕ
= − (1−2ϕ)(p−q+pq)+4ϕ(1−ϕ)
√
p(1−p)q
(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2)2
, which is also decreasing in bias |ϕ− 12 |
when p < q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 .
(iv) The supervisor’s bias matters only under the conditions that make Proposition
4 relevant. Then,
∂U4p
∂η
= − (1−2η)(q−p+pq)+4η(1−η)
√
p(1−q)q
(η2+(1−η)2)2
, which decreases in supervisor
bias |η − 12 | when p > 1(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) as well as when p >
(ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))2
(η−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) and η >
ϕ > 12 .
Second, we compare the principal’s payoffs at the exact parameter thresholds that
determine which proposition is relevant. Substituting for ϕ = 12 into U
2
p , we have U
1
p =
U2p . Similarly, when p =
q(1−2ϕ)2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , we have U
1
p = U
3
p , and when p =
1
(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) we
have that U1p = U
4
p . Lastly, when p =
(ηϕ+(1−η)(1−ϕ))2
(η−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) and η > ϕ >
1
2 we have
that U2p = U
4
p . Hence, given η > ϕ, marginal changes in parameter values do not lead
to jumps in the principal’s payoff.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 6] We focus again on the case of η > ϕ. Comparing
the principal’s payoff when using objective performance evaluation only and subjective
performance evaluation only, as given by (12) and (20), respectively, to the payoffs when
combining them, as given by U ip as defined in the proof to Proposition 4, it follows
directly that U1p and U
2
p are (weakly) larger than (12) and (20). Hence, if both p and
q are large enough (i.e. when 1
(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) ≥ p ≥ q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 ), combining objective and
subjective performance evaluation yields lower rents to the agent and, unless η > ϕ >
1
2 , eliminates the bias that might arise when using only objective or only subjective
performance evaluation. Both effects increase the principal’s payoff. Next, suppose that
p < q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , such that the outcome with combined evaluation is biased towards PMR
(Proposition 3). Even when the supervisor would be unbiased (η = 12), the principal
benefits from also using the verifiable performance measure: U3p exceeds (20) for any
p < q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 . Similarly, if p >
1
(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) , such that combined evaluation results
in a bias towards the SR, the principal benefits from also using subjective performance
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evaluation, as U4p is larger than (12) for any p >
1
(1−2η)2
q
(1−q) even when ϕ =
1
2 .
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 7] If pS <
(ηSϕ+(1−ηS)(1−ϕ))2
(ηS−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) and ϕ ≤ 12 or ϕ >
ηS >
1
2 , the principal’s payoff with both supervisors is either U
1
p or U
3
p , which are
both increasing in p and independent of η. Hence, the principal prefers the specialist.
Similarly, if pS >
1
(1−2ηS)2
q
(1−q) > pG, the specialist yields principal’s payoff U
4
p , while
the generalist yields payoff U1p . Result (i) in Proposition 5 showed that starting from U
1
p ,
an increase in p such that the principal is forced to allow for a bias, yielding payoff U4p ,
benefits the principal for any η. This proves the first part. When ηS > ϕ >
1
2 and pS <
(ηSϕ+(1−ηS)(1−ϕ))2
(ηS−ϕ)2
q
(1−q) , employing the specialist supervisor yields payoff U
2
p . Employing
the generalist yields U1p if pG ≥ q(1−2ϕ)
2
1+q(1−2ϕ)2 , otherwise it yields Up =
(√
(1−p)q+(2ϕ−1)√p
)2
2(ϕ2+(1−ϕ)2) .
Note that the latter expression mirrors U3p , and holds for η < ϕ and ϕ >
1
2 (here relevant
when employing a generalist as ηG =
1
2), while U
3
p is derived under the conditions η < ϕ
and ϕ > 12 (see Proposition 3). Comparing these payoffs yield the two conditions in case
(i), respectively. Lastly, when pG >
1
(1−2ηS)2
q
(1−q) , the specialist yields principal’s payoff
U4p , while the generalist yields payoff U
1
p . Comparing these payoffs gives the condition
in the proposition.
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